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At least since the classic papers of Rybczynski (1955) and Mundell (1957), in-
ternational economists have been interested in the link between trade and factor
mobility. The great majority of this work has been concerned primarily with capital
mobility (and FDI in particular), however, a considerable amount of work has also
focused specically on migration. As we shall note in more detail in the next section,
theoretical work on the link between migration and trade produces no particularly
robust results. Thus, a complement to this theoretical work is a sizable body of es-
sentially ad hoc empirical work. In this paper, we take a distinctive methodological
approach to the empirics of trade and migration based on generalized propensity
scoring.
While the pure general equilibrium eects that drive the work of Rybczynski and
Mundell are the focus of most trade theoretic research, sociologists, demographers
and even some economists have begun to emphasize the importance of networks in
both trade and migration. These considerations t naturally in the gravity-based
empirical approach commonly used in the study of both trade and migration. We
build on this body of work by developing a semiparametric approach to the evalua-
tion of the functional form of the relationship between migration stocks and bilateral
imports. Specically, we view bilateral migration stocks (in logs) as a continuous
treatment and bilateral imports as an outcome. We provide strong evidence of a
positive link between migration and trade consistent with the signicant network
eects. However, we also nd that these eects are exhausted at fairly low levels of
migration.
The next section provides an overview of the literature on trade and migration.
This is followed by a discussion of our method, a description of our data, and a
presentation of our results.
2. RESEARCH ON TRADE AND MIGRATION1
There are two, very broadly construed, accounts of the link between trade and
migration: the rst sees migration as real factor arbitrage in the context of neoclas-
sical trade theory; the second sees migration as a socially constructed activity in
the context of network/human capital theory. The former body of work is primarily
theoretical, while the latter is primarily empirical. This paper is most closely related
to the empirical literature, so this section will focus on that work. Before discussing
the empirical literature on the link between trade and migration, we comment briey
on the trade theoretic literature.
1For a more detailed survey of the literature on trade and migration, see Gaston and Nelson
(2011); from which this section draws.
2Beginning with Mundell (1957), trade economists raised the question of whether
trade in goods and trade in factors are complements or substitutes. Mundell proved
what was essentially a converse to Samuelson's (1948, 1949) factor-price equalization
theorem: that, under the conditions of the the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model,
free movement of factors can substitute for free movement of goods (i.e. once factor-
price are equalized, commodity-prices will be equalized). Taken together with the
factor-price equalization theorem, Mundell's commodity-price equalization theorem
implies that, in an HOS world, trade in goods and trade in factors are substitutes.2
As we move away from the assumptions that dene the HOS model, the nature
of the relationship is easily reversed (i.e. trade and factor mobility can easily be
complements). The fundamental paper on this topic is Markusen (1983). This
wealth of possible relationships opens the door to empirical evaluation.
Most trade theoretic work on the trade-migration link treats international la-
bor mobility as formally identical to international capital mobility. Occasionally a
dierence between the two is seen in the location of consumption{with foreign in-
vestment leading to repatriation of earnings and consumption in the origin country
and migration leading to consumption in the host country. If we permit immigrants
to have a preference for goods produced in their country of origin, this creates a
very direct mechanism linking trade to migration.3 Not only does this have a direct
eect on demand for the immigrant-preferred goods, but we would also expect that
demonstration eects would increase the demand for these goods among natives as
well. Given that non-immigrants from a given country (i.e., natives and immigrants
from other countries) will generally dramatically outnumber immigrants from a given
country, we might expect the indirect eect to be larger than the direct eect.
In the last decade or so, empirical work suggesting the presence of large bor-
der eects (Helliwell, 1998, McCallum, 1995) and missing trade (Treer, 1995) has
spurred extensive research on the role of trade costs as a source of these ndings
(Anderson, 2004, Anderson and VanWincoop, 2004) and networks as a response
2Wong (1986) shows that "complementarity" in this context is more subtle that we might have
initially suspected. His analysis is well-worth reading. Gaston and Nelson (2011) also present
Wong's analysis. Since this paper is primarily empirical in nature, we now leave this topic.
3Most of the theoretical research on the complements vs. substitutes questions abstracts from
taste dierences by assuming globally common, homothetic preferences. Once we permit either sys-
tematically dierent preferences or heterogeneity/monopolistic competition, the analysis becomes
more complex. In the HOS world, the obvious assumption is that natives have a strong preference
for their exportable commodity (thus immigrants carry a stronger preference for the exports of
their home country, increasing the host country's demand for imports from the immigrant's home);
but this pattern of preferences can yield the Opp et al. (2009) reverse Rybczynski eect. Similarly,
once we enter the world of country-specic varieties of goods, we are in a world where results are
sensitive to details of market structure (Ethier, 1996).
3to these costs (Combes et al., 2003, Rauch, 2001). A standard tool for evaluating
the eects of such trade costs is the gravity model. Analysis using gravity models
has provided strong support for the notion that social and political dierences, and
poor enforcement of contractual rights, act as barriers to trade. We are particularly
interested here in the evidence of the role of immigrant networks in alleviating these
transaction costs. Of particular interest for us is the way that networks aect the
relationship between migration and trade. Broadly speaking, networks of migrants
might aect international trade by responding to two sources of transaction costs:
uncertainty/incomplete information; and asymmetric information/opportunism.
With respect to the former, the idea is that trade in some commodities re-
quires search and that the cost of such search varies systematically across countries.
Especially for the case of specialised/dierentiated goods, the lack of a deep, well-
developed arms-length market can require costly search. When this search must
occur across international borders, especially between countries with very dierent
social and/or political structures, those costs can be quite high (Portes and Rey,
2005, Rauch, 1999, Rauch and Casella, 2003). In this situation, migrants can act
as weak ties in Granovetter's (1973, 1983, 2005) sense of providing an information
bridge between two dense networks (in this case, suppliers in the home market and
demanders in the host market). That is, because migrants possess economic, cultural
and institutional knowledge about both the home and the host markets, they are able
to mediate economic exchange between those markets, thus increasing trade above
what it would be in the absence of such migration. In this case, migrants engage in
market creation. Because such information problems are expected to be more severe
for dierentiated products, we would expect to nd strong positive eects for trade
in such products, especially between countries with very dierent economic, cultural
and political environments. Arguably, once such a bridge has been constructed, the
need for additional migrants might well be expected to decline.
Unlike transactions costs that emerge through simple lack of knowledge, those
related to asymmetric information, imperfect enforcement of contracts and oppor-
tunism create a more fundamental role for networks.4 In an environment charac-
terized by these problems, the opportunity for mutually benecial trades may be
foregone (Anderson and Young, 2006). In the limit, these problems can cause the
collapse of markets. This, in turn, creates an opportunity for non-market (or mar-
ket replacing) institutions, which, of course, is the opening wedge for Williamson's
4As Rauch (2001) points out, eective networks need not be immigrant or ethnic networks. Any
group of people that share information and are related by bonds of trust, the violation of which are
costly to members of the network, can serve at least as well. However, immigrant-ethnic networks
have served this purpose historically and, unlike old school tie networks, they are relatively easily
identiable at the aggregate level.
4(1975, 1985, 1996) Nobel prize winning development of transaction cost economics.
However, independently of transaction cost economics' emphasis on the role of asym-
metric information and opportunistic behavior in understanding the creation and
operation of rms; anthropologists, sociologists and historians used essentially the
same factors in explaining the role of ethnic networks and diasporas in the orga-
nization of trade across political jurisdictions or, more generally, in the absence of
eective protection of contractual/property rights (Bonacich, 1973, Cohen, 1969,
1971, Curtin, 1984, Geertz, 1963, 1978, Polanyi, 1957, 1968). More recently the
analytical structures of transaction cost economics (Landa, 1981, 1994) and game
theory (Dixit, 2003a, b, 2004, 2009, Greif, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997) have provided
more formal frameworks for examining these relationship-based trade links. The
basic idea here is that ties of trust and social capital more generally, built up among
co-ethnics in the migration process can substitute for imperfect contract enforcement
(whether a function of incomplete contracts or lack of eective judicial systems). The
enforcement mechanism in this case is exclusion from the social and economic bene-
ts of the community/network.5 As with the case of transaction costs deriving from
informational problems, where migrants engage in market creation, we would expect
contracting problems to be most severe in the case of goods for which a deep, arms-
length market does not exist. However, unlike that case, where we might expect
the need for a weak-link to decline once the information bridge has been built; as
long as the contracting problem remains in a given market, the need for the contract
enforcement role of the network will remain in place. Furthermore, to the extent
that the role of the ethnic community declines with successive generations, we might
even expect a need for continuing ows of migrants to support that role.
Gravity modeling of trade, with the variables extended to include a migration
variable, takes the form
Iijt = Mijt + Gijt + ijt + "ijt; (1)
where Iijt is the value of dyadic trade (exports or imports) between partner country
i and reference country j at time t in logs, Mijt is the ow or stock of immigrants in
logs from country j in country i at time t, Gijt is a row vector of standard gravity
5While economists tend to stress exclusion from economic benets (e.g., Greif, 1993), one of the
reasons that ethnic communities play such an important role here (rather than simply repeated
interaction of more-or-less randomly generated networks) is the broader role of social solidarity.
This social solidarity is often linked to distinctiveness relative to the native community induced via
common language and religion, as well as ghetto-ization and endogamy. Thus, to be excluded from
the community implies substantially higher costs than simple exclusion from trading networks.
Epstein and Gang (2006) develop an interesting analysis of the tension between the benets of the
social network and those of assimilation in the context of a model of international trade.
5variables in logs (e.g., reference and target country GDP, distance and other trade
cost variables), ijt is a vector of (country or country-pair and/or time) xed eects
and "ijt is an error term. The parameter of interest in this work is . Since these
models are commonly estimated in logs, this can be interpreted as an estimate of
the elasticity of trade volume with respect to immigration.
The seminal paper here is Gould's (1994) study of the eect of immigrants on
trade between the United States and 47 trading partners that were also sources of
US immigrants, for the years 1970-1986. In addition to estimating a gravity model,
extended to include stocks of immigrants from the foreign country residing in the
United States, for bilateral aggregate imports and exports; Gould also estimated
separate regressions for imports and exports of producer and consumer goods. With
respect to aggregate imports and exports, Gould found immigrants increased trade
(though at lower levels than much of the later literature); and, somewhat unusually
given later results, found a larger eect on exports than on imports. The usual
inference from this pattern is that preference eects explain the dierence between
the import eect and the export eect (since the network eects are apparently
taken to be symmetric). Thus, this is taken as evidence against a signicant role for
preference eects. When the analysis was done on consumer and producer goods
separately, Gould found the eect on consumer goods was larger for both imports
and exports. Gould's presumption was that consumer goods are more dierentiated
than producer goods and took this as evidence of network eects. For our purposes,
an important element of Gould's analysis is the attempt to identify the level of
immigration associated with reduced eect on trade. To do this, Gould estimates
a specic functional form for the eect of immigrants on transaction costs which
is decreasing at a decreasing rate. While this permits him to estimate the point
at which the positive eect of immigrants on trade begins to decline, it is also
apparently responsible for the sizable dierence between Gould's results and those
of other work with otherwise similar specications. In the event, Gould nds that
the eect of immigrants on exports is exhausted at a quite small level (12;016
immigrants), while the eect on imports is exhausted at a substantially larger level
(370;879 immigrants).
Building on Gould's original work, a sizable literature of gravity-based estimates
of the eect of migration on trade has developed. The single most studied refer-
ence country is the US (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2008, Co et al., 2004, Dunlevy, 2006,
Dunlevy and Hutchinson, 1999, Herander and Saavedra, 2005, Hutchinson and Dun-
levy, 2001, Jansen and Piermartini, 2009, Millimet and Osang, 2007, Mundra, 2005,
Tadesse and White, 2008, 2010, White, 2007b, 2009, White and Tadesse, 2008a,
b); but there are also analyses featuring Canada (Ching and Chen, 2000, Head and
Ries, 1998, Helliwell, 1997, Jiang, 2007, Partridge and Furtan, 2008, Wagneret al.,
62002); the UK (Ghatak et al., 2009, Girma and Yu, 2002); Switzerland (Kandogan,
2009, Tai, 2009); Germany (Bruder, 2004); Denmark (White, 2007a); France (Bri-
ant et al., 2009); Spain (Blanes-Crist obal 2004, 2005, 2008); Greece (Piperakis et
al., 2003); Italy (Murat and Pistoresi, 2009); the EU 15 (Parsons, 2005); Australia
(White and Tadesse, 2007); New Zealand (Bryant et al., 2004); and Malaysia (Hong
and Santhapparaj, 2006). Very broadly, and with very few exceptions, these papers
consistently nd signicant positive eects of immigration on trade - whether mea-
sured as imports or exports. Furthermore, of the papers that report results for both
imports and exports, it was about twice as common to nd the estimated eect
of immigration on imports greater than that on exports. Again, this is taken as
evidence that preference eects and network eects are both operating.
A number of papers have taken advantage of the existence of trade and migration
data collected at sub-national levels: Canadian provinces (Helliwell, 1997, Partridge
and Furtan, 2008, Wagner et al., 2002); French d epartements (Briant et al., 2009,
Combes et al., 2005); and US states (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2008, Bardhan and
Guhathakurta, 2004, Co et al., 2004, Dunlevy, 2006, Millimet and Osang, 2007,
Tadesse and White, 2008, 2010, White, 2009). The rst benet of using sub-national
data is that it permits the analysis to focus on more specically dened geographic
regions, thus achieving greater precision in estimation. A related benet is that
analysts can control for national level common determinants of trade and migration
using country-level xed eects, but still retaining sub-national level variation for
identifying the eect of migrants. A particularly interesting paper in this group is
Herander and Saavedra's (2005), which attempts to identify the relative eects of
both state- and national-level migrant stocks. Consistent with the motivation for all
of these papers, Herander and Saavedra nd strong evidence that the local eects
are larger than the national eects. This suggests that, whether they are mainly
market creating or market replacing, network links are about proximity. Herander
and Saavedra also test for whether size of previous immigrant stock reduces the eect
of current immigrants on trade ows. Consistent with Gould's result, these authors
nd that previous immigrant stock does reduce the eect of current immigrants.
Given the discussion above (i.e., that market creating networks should experience
such a decline, while market substituting links do not), this would appear to be
strong evidence in favor of the relatively greater importance of market creation.
To summarize: there is strong and consistent support for immigration having
a positive eect on trade; that link appears to be stronger for commodities whose
trade is likely to involve informational problems; and, in turn, that link appears to
be stronger for trade with countries that are dierent from the reference country
on a number of dimensions; and that link appears to be stronger when the partner
7country is characterized by institutional problems.6 This would seem to be strong
evidence for the network story. However, since these analyses are never carried out
in the context of a structural analysis that permits an evaluation of the relative price
eects that drive the general equilibrium analysis standard in the trade theoretic
accounts, these results neither permit comparison with the trade theoretic claims,
nor do they speak directly (or unambiguously) to the issues of whether trade and
migration are substitutes or complements.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces
the econometric methodology utilized for identication of the causal eect of im-
migration stocks on bilateral imports and its functional form. Section 3 presents
details on the sources and the construction of data on dependent and independent
variables. Also, that section summarizes descriptive statistics. Section 4 summa-
rizes the results and interprets the ndings in the light of previous research. The
last section concludes with a summary of the most important ndings.
3. GENERALIZED PROPENSITY SCORES
For estimation of causal eects of bilateral immigration stocks on bilateral imports,
we resort to so-called generalized propensity score (GPS) estimation. This method
which was introduced by Hirano and Imbens (2004) and Imai and van Dyk (2004)
allows us to identify the impact of migration on imports without imposing strong
assumptions about the functional form of the relationship. Intuitively, the appealing
property of the propensity score approach is to incorporate all information necessary
for avoiding potential biases in one scalar. This allows matching on one dimension
only instead of controlling for numerous covariates that may enter in dierent func-
tional forms. The method is particularly suitable when it comes to addressing eco-
nomic issues that are expected to feature non-monotonic relationships as the GPS
can be used to derive a exible dose-response function. Applications of the general-
ized - continuous - propensity score deal with labor market programs (see Kluve et
al. 2007), regional transfer schemes (see Becker et al. 2010), and FDI (see Du and
Girma, 2009).
Let us use index i = 1;:::;N to refer to a sample of country-pairs7 and de-
note the unit-level dose-response function of log imports Ii() as a function of (log
6Corruption and low institutional quality would, presumably, also be a problem for the reference
country. There is essentially no evidence of this side of the link given that virtually all of the
reference countries are characterized by globally quite high institutional quality.
7Immigration stocks for pair i represent the number of immigrants residence in country m with
origin x. We will consider their impact on imports of m from x. The indexation distinguishes
between pair a pair involving, say, Canada as the source country and the United States as the
residence country from a pair with Canada as the residence country and the United States as the
source country.
8immigration) treatments by  2 M. Empirically M is an open interval with full
support in real space. We are interested in estimating the average dose-response
function across all country-pairs i, D() = E[Ii()]. Estimation uses information
on three sets of data: observable variables determining log immigration (or treat-
ment intensity) Xi, log immigration which we refer to as treatment Mi, and the
outcome in terms of bilateral imports corresponding to the level of treatment re-
ceived, Ii = Ii(Mi). For the sake of simplicity of notation, we may drop index i in
what follows and assume that I()2M;M;X are dened on a common probability
space, that  is continuously distributed with respect to a Lebesgue measure on M,
and that I = I(M) is a well dened random variable.
In this setting, the denition of unconfoundedness for binary treatments gener-
alizes to weak unconfoundedness for continuous treatments
I() ? MjX for all  2 M: (2)
Country-pairs dier in their characteristics representing columns of X so that they
are more or less likely to host a certain number of immigrants. By Assumption (2),
conditional on X, any remaining dierence in the number of immigrants M across
country pairs is independent of the potential imports I(). Assumption (2) estab-
lishes weak unconfoundedness because it does not require joint independence of all
potential levels of import outcomes, I()2M;M;X. Instead, it requires conditional
independence to hold per treatment (immigration) level.
Following Hirano and Imbens (2004), the generalized propensity score may be
dened as
R = r(;X); (3)
where r(;X) is the conditional density of the treatment given the covariates. R
is a valid compact measure of similarity or dissimilarity across country-pairs if it
fullls a balancing property in the following sense: within strata with the same value
of r(;X), the probability that M =  does not depend on the value of X. In other
words, when looking at two country pairs with the same probability (conditional
on observable characteristics X) of hosting a certain number of immigrants, their
treatment level is independent of X. That is, the generalized propensity score
summarizes all information in the multi-dimensional vector X so that
X ? 1fM = gjr(;X):
Combining this mechanical property of the GPS with the assumption of uncon-
foundedness, the balancing property implies that assignment to treatment is weakly
unconfounded given the GPS (see Hirano and Imbens, 2004). Then, we can evaluate
the GPS at a given treatment level by considering the conditional density of the
9respective treatment level . Hence, each and every number of immigrants in a pair
i translates into a unique propensity score.
We reduce (if not eliminate) the biases associated with dierences in the observ-
ables X in two steps (see Hirano and Imbens, 2004). First, we estimate the condi-
tional expectation of I as a function of two scalar variables, the number of bilateral
immigrants M and GPS R, (;r) = E[IjM = ;R = r]. Second, we estimate the
dose-response function at a particular level of immigration stock by averaging (;r)
over the GPS at that particular level of immigration, D() = E[(;r(;X))].8 Fi-
nally, we estimate the treatment eect function T (), which is the rst derivative
of D() with respect to the argument.
4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
We employ three sets of variables in this paper. First, bilateral imports of a country
from a partner country (measured in the year 2007) as the outcome of interest.9 The
bilateral import data stems from the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics. Second,
we use the largest existing data-set on bilateral stocks of immigrants collected and
published by Parsons et al. (2007). Third, we use a large number of determinants
of bilateral migration (and trade) as elements of X.
Specically, we employ the following observables in X. First of all, we use a third-
order polynomial function for log GDP, log population, and log GDP per capita.
Each of these variables enter as exporter (country of origin) and importer (country
of residence) term. This models in a fairly exible way the role of economic market
size, per-capita income, and population. Second, we control for the residence and
country of origin's unemployment rate and GINI coecients (in a log-linear fashion)
as measures of unemployment risk and inequality. We resort to the World Bank's
WDI database for data on GDP, population, unemployment rate as well as GINI
coecients. Third, we employ geographical variables such as log bilateral distance,
and a number of indicator variables such as for location of the countries of origin
and residence at the same continent, a common border between them, a common
language between them, and whether the country of origin is a member of OECD or
not. Fourth, we include dummy variables for whether two countries have ratied a
goods trade agreement (GTA) or a services trade agreement (STA) with each other.
Finally, we employ three variables indicating the political situation between two
8Notice that we do not average over the GPS R = r(;X) but over the score evaluated at the
immigration level of interest, r(;X). Hence, we x  and average over Xi and r(;Xi) 8i.
9We have experimented with using other years or averages of years around 2005. There seems
to be little role to play for the timing of measurement of the data. However, we chose imports
to be measured subsequent to immigration stocks to eliminate at least correlation of trade and
migration through time-specic shocks.
10countries in a pair: the absolute dierence in the PolityIV index between the country
of origin and the country of residence as a measure of diering degrees of political
freedom between the two economies ( Polity4 score); one pertaining to dierences
in regime durability (how long governments are in oce on average) between the
two countries ( Regime durability); and one measuring the number of years that
elapsed since the last armed conict between the two countries. The data on political
regimes we use stems from the Polity IV Project of the Center for Systemic Peace
while the information on armed conicts stems from the Armed Conict Database
provided by the International Institute For Strategic Studies. Altogether, we cover
130 countries of origin and 27 countries of residence in our analysis (see the Appendix
for a list). Table 1 provides the mean, minimum, maximum, and standard deviation
for all variables we use in our study.
| Table 1 here |
5. RESULTS
We will present the results from our empirical analysis in two subsections. The
rst one will summarize estimation of the GPS and shed light on the balancing
property before and after conditioning on similar levels of the GPS. After that, we
will estimate and discuss the dose-response function suggesting how log immigrant
stocks are related to log import ows and the derivative of that function, which is
referred to as the treatment eect function in the literature.
a. Estimating GPS and the Balancing Property
To construct the GPS we have to assume a certain distribution function for the
treatment, i.e. the bilateral migration stocks. The log transformed migration stocks
turn out to be approximately normally distributed with skewness  0:11 and kurtosis













where we estimate ^  by ordinary least squares. Table 2 provides the result for an
OLS resgression using the covariates described above. It turns out that we can ex-
plain dierent treatment intensities fairly well, which is important for constructing
a powerful GPS. Yet, the individual eects of the covariates reported in Table 2 are
only of minor importance for our analysis.
For proving that our GPS performs well in absorbing the information crucial for
assignment of dierent treatment intensities it is instructive to organize the data
11in groups and blocs. In particular, such a structure allows us to test the so-called
balancing property. The latter is required for the GPS to be a suitable measure of
comparability among observations. Once the balancing property is met, condition-
ing on the GPS (i.e., considering observations with a similar GPS), eliminates the
dierences in the covariates across units of observation. Then, the (immigration-
imports) dose-response function can be estimated consistently.
Groups are determined on the basis of the variation in continuous (log) bilateral
immigration stocks, while blocs are based on the estimated GPS. To which extent
comparability of country pairs with a specic immigration level and control pairs
is achieved becomes evident from balancing property tests on unconditional versus
conditional comparisons of country pairs across log immigration groups of the data.
The latter compares country pairs across dierent log immigration groups only for
units within a specic bloc of predicted bilateral log immigration whereas the former
disregards the information incorporated in the GPS scores. Ideally, the signicant
dierences in covariates across treatment groups that indicate a critical selection
bias vanish completely after controlling for the GPS.
| Tables 3 here |
Table 3 summarize t-tests about mean comparisons for all covariates used to de-
termine the level of (log) immigration between pairs with a particular observable
level of immigration. The treatment groups are created according to the distribu-
tion of log immigrants and comply with almost identical group size where Group 1
and Group 2 feature the lowest and highest immigration levels, respectively. Note
that we disregard country pairs with zero immigration which diminishes our sample
by 11 observations. We compare each group's covariates with the covariates of all
other groups and report the test statistics from two-sided t-tests. The relevance of a
selections into treatment intensities, i.e. dierent immigration levels becomes obvi-
ous from the t-values which with only few exception indicate signicant dierences
across groups.
In order to ensure a sample that consists of country pairs with suciently similar
characteristics for achieving suitable matches, we establish a common support con-
dition. This means that we keep only comparable units with a common probability
support in GPS-space. In doing so we calculate the probability to receive the median
immigration level of group M
j
M for each country pair i and for all groups j 2 f1;2;3g,
^ Ri(M
j
M;Xi) using equation 4 and the estimated coecients from Table 2. We plot
these GPS values for country pairs in group j against country pairs not in group j.
Now, we keep only control country pairs in other groups than j if they share a com-
mon GPS support with treated pairs in group j. Since this is done for each of the
12three groups, we ensure that each country pair within a certain group lies within the
range of observable characteristics of each other group. This procedure is illustrated
in Figure 1 where the grey bars represent the GPS scores of country pairs within the
respective group and the black bars represent the control group's GPS scores. All
observations in black that lie outside the range of grey bars are dropped. Thereby
we exclude 651 country pairs but ensure comparability of the ones left in the sample.
| Table 4 and Figure 1 here |
Before we test whether conditioning on the GPS indeed improves the balancing of
covariates, we impose a bloc structure on the estimated GPS value. That is, we con-
dition on the ex-ante probability of receiving a certain immigration level. We assign
each observation to one out of six blocs within each group based on the estimated
GPS. We dene these six blocs for each group on the basis of the distribution of GPS
scores evaluated at the median immigration level of the respective group. The blocs
are generated such that they consist of approximately the same number of group
members and Bloc 1 always contains the country pairs with lowest probability of re-
ceiving the median treatment intensity of the respective group. By design, the sum
of observations over blocs in a group yields the total number of observations in that
group after enforcing the common support condition. Once we have determined the
blocs, not only the group members but also the control units { not belonging to the
same group { are assigned to a bloc on the basis of their individual probability of
receiving the median treatment intensity of the respective group. Using this struc-
ture we perform t-tests for treatment and control units belonging to the same bloc.
We experimented with dierent numbers of groups and blocs, and it turns out that
distinguishing three groups and six blocs is capable of avoiding a violation of the
balancing property in terms of mean comparisons of the covariates underlying the
GPS within each of the groups. Table 4 illustrates the cell size (i.e., the number of
country-pairs) across the three groups and six blocs for treated country pairs with
a certain level of log immigration and control pairs with dierent levels thereof.
Table 5 summarizes t-tests about mean comparisons for all covariates account-
ing for the estimated GPS evaluated at the respective group's median treatment
intensity relying again on equation 4 and the estimated coecients from Table 2.
Accordingly, we run separate t-tests for each bloc and group in the matrix presented
in Table 4. For instance, we compare the observations in cell Group 1/Bloc 1 to
observations in cell Control 1/Bloc 1 and test for equality of covariates in terms of
their means.10 Table 5 displays the mean t-statistics for each group and all covari-
10One could even test for equality of higher moments. However, with the number of observations
at hand, these tests would have very small power.
13ates, where the t-statistics are weighted by the number of observations in order to
calculate the mean t-statistic.
| Table 5 here |
Comparing the results in Tables 3 and 5 we can assess the quality of the GPS as
follows. First, highlighting mean comparisons which exhibit a t-statistics which are
signicantly dierent from zero when using two-tailed test statistics and a nominal
test size of 10% suggests that the covariates are largely dierent unconditional on
(i.e., before imposing) the bloc structure in Table 5. Both the average and the me-
dian t-statistic in that table are way higher than 2:58 which is the critical value for
a signicance level of one percent or less with as many country-pairs as underlying
the t-tests in Table 3 (the the gure at the bottom of the table). Conditioning on
the structure of six blocs and ensuring common support improves the balancing dra-
matically, according to Table 5. When using only comparable units with a common
probability support in GPS-space we are left with 1;340 country pairs. Regarding
the balancing property, the median and average t-statistic drop from 6:05 and 7:43
in Table 3 to 0:70 and 0:75 in Table 5, respectively. There is only one covariate,
namely continuity (a binary indicator variable) in Group 3, for which balancing is
rejected. Even that problem could be avoided by using a larger number of groups
or blocs. However, we have decided against that for presentation, since there is
no eect on the estimates of the dose-response function D and its derivative, the
treatment eect function T .
b. Estimating the Dose-response and Treatment Eect Functions
The dose-response function can be estimated by regressing log bilateral imports
and log immigration stocks conditional on the GPS as a control function. This can be
done quite exibly by employing a polynomial parametrization of the nexus between
(log) immigration and (log) imports, a polynomial about the GPS, and interactive
terms between the GPS and (log) immigration. We experimented with various poly-
nomials of log immigration and the GPS as well as with their interactions. We chose
to disregard polynomial terms that turned out to remain insignicant and chose a
third-order polynomial of log immigration stocks, a linear GPS term and a linear
interaction between log immigration and GPS as the preferred specication. Also,
using even higher-ordered polynomial functions does not add relevant information
to the process.11 The corresponding results for the parsimonious, semi-parametric
dose-response function are summarized in Table 6. The dose-response function is
11The inclusion of additional polynomials does not qualitatively aect the run of the dose-
response curve.
14estimated from 1;322 country pairs,12 and it is estimated at an R2 of 0:257 which
is quite remarkable given the parsimonious specication.
| Table 6 and Figure 2 here |
A better way of assessing the dose-response function than by way of Table 6 is by
graphical representation of the point estimates together with a condence interval.
For the latter, we pick the 90% level and split the function into two separate graphs.
Due to the wide range of immigration levels splitting up the dose-response function
into two graphs facilitates the understanding of the relationship. In Figure 2, we do
so in panel A, considering the nexus between log migration and log exports for all
country pairs below the observed median immigration level on the left-hand side and
for the sub-set of pairs with a log immigration stock beyond the median on the right-
hand side. This is useful, since most of the nonlinear action between log bilateral
immigration stocks and log bilateral imports happens at lower levels of immigration.
Quite clearly, there is a positive impact of (log) immigration on (log) imports at the
country-pair level. However, only if immigration stocks exceed a level of about 100
persons does a marginal increase in immigrants trigger signicantly more bilateral
imports than before. This can be seen from the treatment eect functions in the
two graphs in panel B of Figure 2, which are the derivatives of the dose-response
functions in panel A.
Interestingly, the treatment eect function is only positive { i.e., the dose-
response function is only signicantly positively sloped { for levels of immigration
stocks between about 100 and about 4;000 persons. If log immigration stocks exceed
the latter upper bound, immigrants do not trigger additional imports anymore.
In the Appendix, we provide gures pertaining not only to immigration as a
driver of imports but to emigration and immigration as to exert network eects
on trade. However, it turns out that neither the qualitative nor the quantitative
conclusions drawn above change in a substantial way.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has assessed the functional form of the relationship between bilateral
migration stocks and bilateral imports by using semiparametric methods for causal
inference in quasi-experimental settings with continuous treatments. We do this by
viewing bilateral migration stocks (in logs) as a continuous treatment and bilateral
imports as an outcome. The functional form of the impact of migration on imports
was identied under the assumption of weak unconfoundedness, meaning that the
12Even though 1;340 country pairs fulll the common support condition, we loose another 18
observations due to zero trade ows.
15systematic information in bilateral migration can be conditioned out by controlling
for observable determinants of bilateral migration, achieving quasi-randomization.
We provide an informal theoretical background in terms of two hypotheses. First,
bilateral migration may generate information about source and host countries and,
hence, create markets for goods beyond levels implied by other fundamental vari-
ables determining goods trade. Second, bilateral migration may provide for contract
enforcement if moral hazard due, for example, to weak institutions impedes cross-
border goods transactions. The latter does not imply that the trade-stimulating
eect of migration declines with the number of migrants. Using cross-sectional data
on migrants into and out of 27 OECD countries in 130 OECD and non-OECD
economies for the year 2000, we found that imports react to migration in accor-
dance with the market creation hypothesis: a larger number of migrants stimulates
additional imports with at least about 100 migrants, but the eect declines with
the number of migrants. If the number of migrants exceeds about 4,000, there is
no evidence of a proportional increase of imports with migration. These ndings
suggested that the critical mass of migrants needed to stimulate imports and the
maximum amount of migrants beyond which no further imports are stimulated are
much smaller than suggested in previous research which imposed much stronger
functional forms than we did and for the most part looked at individual countries..
7. APPENDIX
a. Country Sample Composition
In all of the paper except Figure 3 we consider immigration into OECD countries
and its impact on imports of 27 OECD countries from 130 economies. In Figure
3, we have allow emigrants beyond immigrants to have a network eect on those
imports. However, then the 27 OECD countries are not only residence but also
source countries and so are the 130 economies. However, we generally focus on an
impact of migration on imports of the OECD economies.
27 OECD residence countries: Australia; Austria; Belgium; Canada; Czech
Republic; Denmark; Finland; Greece; Hungary; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Korea, Rep.;
Mexico; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Slovak Republic;
Spain; Sweden; Turkey; United States; Spain; Switzerland; United Kingdom.
130 OECD and non-OECD source countries: Angola; Albania; United Arab
Emirates; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Burundi; Belgium;
Benin; Burkina Faso; Bangladesh; Bulgaria; Bahrain; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Be-
larus; Bolivia; Brazil; Central African Republic; Canada; Switzerland; Chile; China;
Cote d'Ivoire; Cameroon; Congo, Rep.; Colombia; Comoros; Costa Rica; Cuba;
Czech Republic; Denmark; Dominican Republic; Algeria; Ecuador; Egypt, Arab
Rep.; Spain; Estonia; Finland; France; Gabon; United Kingdom; Georgia; Ghana;
16Guinea; Gambia, The; Greece; Guatemala; Honduras; Croatia; Haiti; Hungary;
Indonesia; India; Ireland; Iran, Islamic Rep.; Iraq; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Jordan;
Japan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Kyrgyz Republic; Cambodia; Korea, Rep.; Kuwait;
Lebanon; Sri Lanka; Lithuania; Latvia; Morocco; Moldova; Madagascar; Mexico;
Macedonia, FYR; Mali; Mongolia; Mozambique; Mauritania; Mauritius; Malawi;
Malaysia; Niger; Nigeria; Nicaragua; Netherlands; Norway; Nepal; New Zealand;
Oman; Pakistan; Panama; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Paraguay; Roma-
nia; Russian Federation; Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Sudan; Senegal; Singapore; Sierra
Leone; El Salvador; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Sweden; Syrian Arab Republic; Togo;
Thailand; Tajikistan; Turkmenistan; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Tan-
zania; Uganda; Ukraine; Uruguay; United States; Venezuela, RB; Vietnam; Yemen,
Rep.; South Africa; Zambia.
b. Immigration plus Emigration as Drivers of Imports
Here, we present Figure 3 which is analogous to Figure 2, except that it displays
the dose-response and treatment functions with respect to stocks of immigrants plus
emigrants rather than immigrants only. However, the nings are quite similar to
Figure 2 both in qualitative as well as in quantitative terms.
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24Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. dev. Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Importsi) 4.97 3.29 -6.908 12.737
Migrationi 27.699 232.379 .001 9336.719
ln(GDPm) 26.486 1.336 23.629 29.853
ln(GDPx) 24.504 1.93 20.712 29.853
ln(Populationm) 16.772 1.181 15.103 19.447
ln(Populationx) 16.566 1.423 13.866 20.949
ln(GDP per capitam) 9.653 .687 8.062 10.51
ln(GDP per capitax) 7.915 1.468 5.125 10.51
Unemploymentm 7.6 3.533 2.421 20.625
Unemploymentx 9.417 5.7 1.48 36
Common borderi .025 .156 0 1
Common languagei .08 .271 0 1
ln(Distancei) 8.511 .976 4.088 9.885
Continenti .301 .459 0 1
GTAi .117 .299 0 1
STAi .095 .274 0 1
OECDx .229 .421 0 1
 Polity4 scorei 6.157 5.186 0 17.6
Ginim 32.737 5.955 23.573 54.107
Ginix 40.51 10.332 21.8 64.099
 Regime durabilityi 42.821 28.511 0 91.125
Years since wari .69 5.861 0 98.5
Observations 1,931
Notes: Subscripts m and x refer to importer (residence country) and exporter (source country) variables, respectively.
Variables with subscript i refer to covariates with bilateral variation. Our data-set consists of 27 residence (import)
countries and 130 countries of origin which yields 3,510 potential country pairs. After dropping country pairs with
missing data on log migration and, especially, determinants thereof, we are left with 1,931 observations.






ln(GDPm)3 .036 .021 
ln(GDPx)3 .003 .003
ln(Populationm) 142.715 31.847 
ln(Populationx) 1.765 6.468
ln(Populationm)2 -7.853 1.914 
ln(Populationx)2 -.006 .369
ln(Populationm)3 .143 .038 
ln(Populationx)3 -.0008 .007
ln(GDP per capitam) -464.6617 56.962 
ln(GDP per capitax) 4.347 2.742
ln(GDP per capitam)2 49.873 6.066 
ln(GDP per capitax)2 -.494 .357
ln(GDP per capitam)3 -1.773 .214 
ln(GDP per capitax)3 .019 .015
Unemploymentx .012 .009
Unemploymentm .078 .015 
Common borderi 1.278 .335 
Common languagei 2.073 .149 
ln(Distancei) -.646 .085 
Continenti .459 .159 
GTAi .632 .251 
STAi -1.149 .250 
OECDx -.207 .160
 Polity4 scorei -.054 .009 
Ginix -.020 .006 
Ginim .129 .015 
 Regime durabilityi .014 .001 




Notes: , ,  denote signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
26Table 3: Treatment Groups and Covariates
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
ln(GDPm) 14.592 2.853 -18.052
ln(GDPx) 18.103 -1.674 -16.036
ln(GDPm)2 14.320 3.027 -17.977
ln(GDPx)2 17.936 -1.588 -15.979
ln(GDPm)3 14.036 3.194 -17.877
ln(GDPx)3 17.717 -1.496 -15.881
ln(Populationm) 5.308 6.654 -12.310
ln(Populationx) 12.850 .357 -13.256
ln(Populationm)2 5.331 6.617 -12.296
ln(Populationx)2 12.670 .471 -13.204
ln(Populationm)3 5.354 6.580 -12.280
ln(Populationx)3 12.441 .578 -13.095
ln(GDP per capitam) 18.511 -4.994 -12.578
ln(GDP per capitax) 10.047 -2.420 -7.482
ln(GDP per capitam)2 18.444 -5.028 -12.482
ln(GDP per capitax)2 10.197 -2.524 -7.518
ln(GDP per capitam)3 18.342 -5.055 -12.362
ln(GDP per capitax)3 10.287 -2.605 -7.521
Unemploymentx -3.250 1.110 2.134
Unemploymentm 1.751 -.362 -1.388
Common borderi 4.986 3.741 -8.860
Common languagei 7.645 .790 -8.477
ln(Distancei) -11.236 2.591 8.449
Continenti 10.810 -3.861 -6.725
GTAi 6.050 -.523 -5.513
STAi 3.159 .275 -3.437
OECDx 9.453 -1.265 -8.111
 Polity4 scorei -5.207 -.999 6.233
Ginix -11.399 2.064 9.163
Ginim -.458 3.003 -2.544
 Regime durabilityi 10.025 -4.302 -5.532
Years since wari 3.099 1.763 -4.885
Observations 643 645 643
Median t-value 6.05
Mean t-value 7.43
Notes: The three groups of approximately the same size are generated according to the distribution of migration
stocks. t-values reported in bold face indicate signicance at the 5% level.
27Table 4: Cell size for comparison of treated and control units in the
matrix of 6 blocs and 3 groups
Bloc Group 1 Control 1 Group 2 Control 2 Group 3 Control 3
1 82 639 95 345 47 710
2 81 105 96 130 47 111
3 81 54 96 86 46 110
4 80 27 95 69 46 69
5 82 20 96 58 48 35
6 81 9 95 79 46 26
Notes: The three groups of approximately the same size are generated according to the distribution of migration
stocks. The bloc-assignment is carried out on the basis of the GPS distribution evaluated at the median treatment
intensity of the respective group.
28Table 5: Balance of Covariates accounting for the GPS
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
ln(GDPm) -.923 .390 -.407
ln(GDPx) 1.850 -.933 .363
ln(GDPm)2 -.976 .404 -.359
ln(GDPx)2 1.871 -.952 .382
ln(GDPm)3 -1.031 .417 -.311
ln(GDPx)3 1.889 -.967 .397
ln(Populationm) -1.189 1.304 -.088
ln(Populationx) 1.028 -.329 -.298
ln(Populationm)2 -1.193 1.265 -.035
ln(Populationx)2 1.009 -.319 -.281
ln(Populationm)3 -1.199 1.225 .019
ln(Populationx)3 .987 -.309 -.260
ln(GDP per capitam) .322 -1.296 -.612
ln(GDP per capitax) 1.158 -.778 .698
ln(GDP per capitam)2 .332 -1.333 -.582
ln(GDP per capitax)2 .341 -1.368 -.552
ln(GDP per capitam)3 1.301 -.865 .701
ln(GDP per capitax)3 1.425 -.937 .693
Unemploymentx -1.394 .770 -.142
Unemploymentm -.254 .287 .342
Common borderi 1.353 1.029 -2.249
Common languagei 1.017 -.632 -.068
ln(Distancei) -1.185 .919 .549
Continenti 1.103 -1.049 -.347
GTAi 1.331 -.790 .056
STAi 1.218 -.507 -.098
OECDx 1.477 -.949 .668
 Polity4 scorei -.705 -.158 .093
Ginix -.701 .100 1.254
Ginim -.328 .404 .536
 Regime durabilityi .830 -1.297 -.587
Years since wari -.058 .687 -.007
Observations 487 573 280
Median t-value 0.70
Mean t-value .75
Notes: The three groups of approximately the same size are generated according to the distribution of migration
stocks. Observations which do not satisfy the common support condition are excluded from the respective groups.
In order to account for the GPS values we discretize the GPS values evaluated at the median treatment intensity of
the respective group into six blocs of approximately same size according to the GPS distribution. t-values reported
in bold face indicate signicance at the 5% level.
29Table 6: Estimation of the Dose-Response Function
Coef. Std. err.
ln(Mi) -.160 .003 
ln(Mi)2 .022 .0003 
ln(Mi)3 .009 .0001 
Ri 3.149 .028 
Ri*ln(Migrationi) 4.601 .015 
Constant 4.240 .006 
Observations 1,322
R2 .257
Notes: , ,  denote signicance levels at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. ln(Mi) refers to logarithm of the stock of
immigrants in importer country m which originate from exporter country x. Ri refers to generalized propensity score
calculated according to equation (4) using the coecients from the rst stage regression in Table 2. We estimate the
standard errors of the dose-response function by bootstrapping with 2,000 iterations that take into account that the
second-stage estimates involve imprecision from rst-stage estimates. We loose 18 observations due to zero bilateral
trade ows.
30Figure 1: Common Support of the Generalized Propensity Score
Notes: The groups are generated according to the distribution of migration stocks such that the three groups
are approximately of the same size. Country pairs with relatively low migration belong to Group 1 whereas
pairs with high migration belong to Group 3. In each histogram, the generalized propensity scores are evaluated
at the median migration level of the respective group, for both the observations within that particular group as
well as for the respective control observations belonging to all other groups.Figure 2: Effects of Immigration on Imports
A. Dose-Response Functions
Below Median Above Median
B. Treatment Eect Function
Below Median Above Median
Notes: Observations with treatment level in the highest and lowest 5% are trimmed. The 90% condence
intervals (indicated by the dashed lines) are based on bootstrapped standard errors with 2,000 replications.Figure 3: Effects of Immigration and Emigration on Imports
A. Dose-Response Functions
Below Median Above Median
B. Treatment Eect Function
Below Median Above Median
Notes: Observations with treatment level in the highest and lowest 5% are trimmed. The 90% condence
intervals (indicated by the dashed lines) are based on bootstrapped standard errors with 2,000 replications.